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## UNIT 14 POLITICO-SECURITY ISSUES

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### 14.1 INTRODUCTION

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“If you want peace, be prepared for war” is an old slogan that presents to us the debate between war and peace. When states acquire weapons they are not always for conquest. In most cases they would be used to preserve their independence and sovereignty. States are not at war with each other most of the times; yet they would spend a significant amount of finances to building up their armaments. We are often told of the damages of an arms race. It is an action reaction process that leads countries to gain superior weapons system to keep ahead of the adversary. It is widely believed that arms race leads to war.

The United Nations has envisaged disarmament and the regulation of armaments as elements in the establishment of an international security system. The General Assembly session devoted to disarmament had called upon the states to abandon the use of force in international relations and seek security through disarmament; this has to be done through a gradual reduction of the present level of armaments. It also stressed on the goal of elimination of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path to a lasting peace.

This Unit looks at arms control and disarmament as a means to establish peace and security in the world. The unit focuses on the Indian perceptions and approaches.

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### 14.2 DEFINITIONS: DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

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In social science literature, the concept of disarmament has been used extensively since the First World War. The concept of Arms Control was developed by the United States in the late 1950s. The United Nations Charter has envisaged disarmament and the regulation of armaments as elements in the progressive establishment of international peace and security.

The World Congress for Disarmament sought to define disarmament as any form of action aimed at limiting, controlling or reducing arms. It was to be a process at transforming the current system

of armed nation states into a planned unarmed peace in which war is no longer an instrument of national policy and people live in security based on justice and solidarity. Hedley Bull has provided the most comprehensive definition of disarmament. Disarmament is reduction or abolition of armaments. It may be unilateral or multilateral; general or local, comprehensive or partial; controlled or uncontrolled. Disarmament is thus considered as a means to achieve the objective of end of war and create conditions for a just and lasting peace. It is a political strategy that involves a set of measures aimed at controlling, limiting and reducing military power potentials (eg. weapons), armed forces and military industrial and technological capabilities.

The dissatisfaction with the progress of general and complete disarmament, the concern of war due to accidental reasons, surprise attack or miscalculation, problems associated with nuclear forces stability and the emergence of anti nuclear lobbies in the 1950s gave rise to the concept of arms control. Arms Control or Arms Limitation involved limitations on number or types of armaments or armed forces, on their deployment or disposition, or on the use of particular types of armaments. Arms Control also encompasses measures designed to reduce the danger of accidental war or surprise attack. While disarmament refers to the reduction/elimination of existing weapons, arms control seeks to limit or control the arms of the future.

A wide range of measures have come to be included in the rubric of arms control. These include: (i) freeze, limit, reduce or abolish certain categories of weapons; (ii) prevent certain military activities; (iii) regulate the deployment of armed forces; (iv) proscribe the transfer of some militarily important items; (v) reduce risk of accidental war; (vi) prohibit the use of certain kinds of weapons or methods of war; and (vii) build confidence amongst states through openness in the military matters.

In political statements the terms 'disarmament' and 'arms control' are often used interchangeably or as complementary to each other. The conceptual shift from disarmament to arms control took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the United States and other western countries. The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries as well as some of the Third World countries continued to use the term disarmament. The United Nations also continued with the use of the term disarmament. One of the aspects that arms control thinking since the 1960s focused on was the prevention, control and management of crises that could erupt in a nuclear war.

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## **14.3 RELATIONSHIP OF FOUR PILLARS OF DISARMAMENT STRATEGY**

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The central pillar of disarmament strategy is reduction of armaments itself. The other three pillars are: (a) arms control; (b) crisis prevention, control and management; and (c) confidence and security building.

Functions of *arms control* are as follows: (i) Reduce the risk of war started by accident; (ii) slowdown global and regional arms race; (iii) increase the predictability amongst the opposing states; (iv) minimise the disparity between heavily and lightly armed states and thus remove the source of instability; (v) encourage states to resort to peaceful means of resolving conflicts; (vi) save resources for economic and social development; (vii) promote trust and better understanding.

The policy of arms control enhances strategic stability by containing the causes of arms race. *Crisis prevention, control and management* focus on political stability and economic development in the regions where there are high levels of tensions. It was the experience of the Cuban Missile crisis and later problems in West Asia and Afghanistan that led to the political

efforts at improving communication between the US and the Soviet Union as a means of crisis prevention and management. One school looks at crisis management simply as a means to peaceful resolution of conflict. Success thus depends on the avoidance of war. The other looks at it as a means of winning. The objective is to get the enemy to back down and gain concessions.

The term *Confidence Building Measures* (CBM) entered the vocabulary on International Relations in the 1970s. Since CBMs have come to focus on security issues, they have now been referred to as Confidence and Security Building measures (CSBM). The purpose of CSBMs are : (i) reassuring states of the non-aggressive intentions of potential adversaries and reducing the possibility of misinterpretation; (ii) narrow the scope of political intimidation by forces of stronger powers; and (iii) minimise the likelihood of inadvertent escalation of hostility in a crisis situation. CSBMs thus aim at avoiding a nuclear first strike, conventional surprise attack or a spillover of regional conflicts into other areas.

Disarmament must be distinguished from demilitarisation. Demilitarisation often involves forced disarmament of countries that have lost wars. Demobilisation that is conducted after a success in a war is also not included in the concept of disarmament.

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## **14.4 THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT**

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The ideal of the United Nations is ‘to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war’. The United Nations is committed to the maintenance of peace and security. The Charter prohibits the use or the threat of use of force and provides for peaceful settlements of disputes. The General Assembly is empowered to consider principles governing disarmament and regulation of armaments and make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members of the Security Council.

A positive achievement has been the recognition that in the nuclear age the question of disarmament concerns all States, whether big or small. Disarmament is no longer a prerogative of a few powerful states; it is a matter concerning the whole humanity. The question of disarmament needs to be pursued at two levels: deliberative and negotiating. On the deliberative plane, all states need to be involved. The UN provides an excellent forum for such a deliberative activity. On the negotiating matter, a small number of states would have to consider disarmament matters with a view of drafting treaties and agreements. India has contributed in a significant manner at both the levels.

### **14.4.1 Disarmament Machinery**

The machinery that deals with disarmament and related issues of arms control etc. within the United Nations framework includes the following:

- i) General Assembly: This is a permanent forum for disarmament deliberations and the main source of both initiatives and recommendations by the international community on the whole spectrum of disarmament related issues.
- ii) First Committee: The First Committee, consisting of all the Members of the UN is one of the main committees of the General Assembly. This Committee deals exclusively with disarmament and related security issues and recommends draft resolutions to the Assembly.

- iii) **Disarmament Commission:** This provides for a subsidiary forum for deliberations on disarmament issues. The task of this deliberative organ is to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament.
- iv) **Ad hoc Committees:** The General Assembly may decide to appoint ad hoc committees in order to deal with specific issues. The ad hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, for example was established to consider suggestions made by various governments on the holding of such a conference.
- v) **Conference on Disarmament (CD):** This is a multilateral arms control negotiating mechanism based in Geneva. This is not an organ of the UN but with the passage of time close links have been developed between the two bodies. Although formally autonomous, the CD takes into account UN General Assembly resolutions and regularly reports to the General Assembly. The CD includes all the nuclear weapon powers and other members on the basis of geographic representation. The resolutions of the CD are transmitted to the UN for signature and ratification by states. Upon its establishment, the CD was mandated to deal in the following areas: nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, reduction of military budgets, reduction of armed forces, disarmament and development, CBMs, and general disarmament matters.
- vi) **UN Department of Disarmament:** This is the organisational unit of the Secretariat dealing with disarmament matters.
- vii) **UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR):** It undertakes independent research on disarmament issues and works in close relationship with the Department of Disarmament Affairs. This institute is located at Geneva.
- viii) **Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters:** This is the Secretary General's Advisory Board that carries out studies on specific subjects.

#### **14.4.2 Nuclear Issues**

Concern about nuclear weapons and ways and means of ensuring that the spread of these weapons is contained has dominated the international agenda since the end of the Second World War. The policy of controls through safeguards came to be sponsored by the nuclear weapon powers to contain the spread of nuclear weapons across the world. This came to be enshrined in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and subsequent efforts like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. The testing of a nuclear device by India in 1974 brought about strong reactions on part of the nuclear weapon powers. The Nuclear Suppliers Club was created to control the spread of nuclear technology. It also saw the debate shift from technical to political discourse on the utility of nuclear weapons and the impositions of various sanctions against the new nuclear weapon states.

Several initiatives have been taken to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Some of the key agreements include the following main treaties:

- i) **The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty:** This is a multilateral treaty which prohibits any nuclear explosion (including those intended for non-military purposes) in the atmosphere, outer space

or under water or in any environment if the explosion would cause radioactive debris in any country. India is a signatory to this treaty.

- ii) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968): The NPT became the first step to the construction of an effective international regime designed to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT provided for a commitment by the non-weapon states to refrain from producing or acquiring nuclear weapons. India found it discriminatory and has not signed it.
- iii) The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty: This is a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in which the parties undertook to prohibit, prevent and not carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons.
- iv) The 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty: This is also a US-USSR bilateral agreement that seeks to regulate the explosions which can be conducted outside the nuclear weapons test sites and which may therefore be considered for peaceful purposes. Both the latter two treaties are, in a sense, additions to the Partial Test Ban Treaty that seek to cover the loopholes of the first.
- v) The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The Comprehensive Test ban Treaty (CTBT) was looked at as the most important means to tackle both, horizontal and vertical proliferation. It was claimed that by banning all explosions, the CTBT would have (a) constrained the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; (b) end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; (c) contribute to the process of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and (d) strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT could not get through in the CD. However, it was adopted by a huge majority by the UN General Assembly. It has been signed by over 100 countries – the first being the United States of America, though the US Senate refused to ratify it in 1999. Thus, it has gone into cold storage. Terming it discriminatory, India has not signed it.

The idea of establishing nuclear weapon free zones in populated areas of the world, as opposed to areas like the Antarctic, was conceived with a view to extend the purview of nuclear nonproliferation and ensure that new states do not go in for nuclear weapons. Some of the prominent arrangements include the following:

- i) Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) covering the Latin American region.
- ii) Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) covering the South Pacific region.
- iii) Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula (1992).

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## **14.5 INDIA'S DISARMAMENT POLICY**

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Disarmament and promotion of world peace have always been the basic objectives of India's foreign policy. The greatest peril that the world faces today is the threat of a nuclear war. Disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, has always been a matter of concern to India. The very existence of nuclear weapons and the continuation of arms race poses a threat to the survival of mankind. Nuclear weapons are neither weapons of war, nor should they be invested with a halo of peacekeeping. India has always maintained that the correct approach, direction and concepts stemming from internationally agreed goals and priorities in the field of disarmament

would need to be strictly adhered to, otherwise the comity of nations would never be able to achieve the goal of disarmament.

In the area of nuclear weapons India has put forward several significant proposals with a view of stopping the arms race. India's nuclear energy programme is dedicated to the utilisation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Some of the key initiatives are as follows:

- i) In 1954 India proposed an immediate suspension of all testing of nuclear weapons, pending the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban.
- ii) In 1964 India suggested that in order to really solve the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal proliferation of weapons should be stopped simultaneously and together within the framework of the same international treaty.

*An overview of the Interrelationship among the four related concepts of disarmament strategy:*

Concepts	Disarmament	Arms Control	Crisis Prevention, Control and Management	Confidence Building Measures
<b>Policy Goals</b>	Peace and international collective security	War prevention	Prevent escalation into war	Positive climate for détente
<b>Systemic Goals</b>	Rule of international law	Enhance strategic stability	Code of conduct, cooperation in crisis	Enhance early warning for surprise attacks
<b>Action Goals</b>	Limitation, Regulation, Reduction, Elimination, Destruction.	Damage limitation if deterrence fails, Cost Reduction	Enhance communication; strengthen non-intervention regime	Openness, transparency, predictability
<b>Objects</b>	Armaments, Military Industry (R&D) Manpower, Military bases	Armaments, Manpower, Budget, Arms transfers	Prevent emergence of crisis, prevent spillover	Information Verification Announcement Communication Constraints Declaratory mechanism.
<b>Scope</b>	Global (UN) Regional Tri/bi lateral Areas: Weapons, Industry, Manpower, Military Bases	Area: Weapons industry	Area: Crisis communication, accident prevention.	Area: Prevent horizontal escalation, Disengagement.
<b>Procedure</b>	Unilateral gradualist (mutual reciprocation) treaty	Unilateral (procurement, force structure) gradualist treaty	Unilateral (Behavioural constraints)	Unilateral, Gradualist political agreements
<b>Achievements</b>	Biological weapons convention	NPT, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, SALT, ABM.	Hotline agreement, Incidents at Sea agreement	CSCE, Helsinki (1975)

(Source: Hans Gunter Brauch, *Survey of Recent and Ongoing Research in the Social and Human Sciences on Disarmament* (UNESCO, 1988), p.32.



- iii) In 1974 India called for a total prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as any such use would be a violation of the Charter of the UN and a crime against humanity.
- iv) In 1982 India proposed the following concrete programme of action: (i) The Special Session on Disarmament should consider a binding convention on non-use of nuclear weapons; (ii) as a first step towards eventual cutting of existing stockpiles, a freeze on nuclear weapons and a total stoppage of further production; (iii) immediate suspension of all nuclear tests; (iv) negotiations for achieving a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament within an agreed time frame; and (v) UN to educate the public on the dangers of nuclear warfare.
- v) In 1984 India along with Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania launched a Five-continent Six-Nation Peace Initiative. This five continent initiative called on the nuclear weapon states to halt the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and seek arms reduction leading to complete disarmament.
- vi) India is a signatory or party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925; the partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963; Outer Space Treaty of 1967; the Sea Bed Treaty of 1971; the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972; the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993.

India's approach towards any multilateral disarmament agreement stems from the basic consideration that only equal and non-discriminatory treaties make peace and relaxation of tension and will help to advance towards the goal of disarmament. The Indian refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty stems from this perspective. The non-nuclear weapon states were also critical of the treaty. They perceived this to be a discriminatory treaty. Their main points of criticism were: (i) The asymmetric nature of the treaty provisions that imposed safeguards only on the non-weapons states; (ii) the preservation of commercial interests of the weapon states by providing them the right to explore peaceful uses programme; (iii) the vagueness of the commitments on part of the weapon states; and (iv) the failure to address legitimate security concerns of the non-weapon states.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (1996) was looked at as the most important means to tackle both, horizontal and vertical proliferation. It was claimed that by banning all explosions the CTBT would have (a) constrained the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; (b) end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; (c) contribute to the process of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and (d) strengthen international peace and security. India linked the signing of the CTBT with a time bound global disarmament programme. Indian view was that the NPT had failed to tackle the question of global nuclear disarmament and the CTBT with its implicit limitations on its scope also did not proceed in the direction of the goal of disarmament. India maintained that the five nuclear weapon powers agree on a timetable for total removal of nuclear weapons as a precondition to its acceptance.

### **14.5.1 India's Nuclear Tests and Policy of Disarmament**

The Indian stand on nuclear disarmament goes back to the call for a 'stand still' agreement that Pandit Nehru made in 1954. The Indian position had been that any agreement on a test ban would help reverse the process of competitive armaments. It would also pave the way for an

agreement on disarmament. By the end of 1956, the different approaches of the States to the issue of a test ban had become clear. The Soviet Union and India advocated an early and separate agreement on a ban on all nuclear tests without international verification, as such nuclear tests would not go undetected in any case. The Western countries sought limitation of and an eventual ban on nuclear testing with adequate verification. Eventually, the United States, Britain and Soviet Union began negotiations for the Partial Test Ban Treaty. This treaty was formalised in 1963 and India became party to it. The late sixties saw a concern being expressed by India that the nuclear powers were reluctant to institute any checks on their own stockpiles. The concern was articulated in the debates on the NPT. In fact the discriminatory nature of the NPT became the single point of mention for its rejection by India.

The 1995 decision to extend the NPT for indefinite period and the debate on the CTBT provide for a further clearer articulation of this disarmament posture of India. The Indian stand at the CTBT had been that the treaty was to ‘contribute effectively to the prevention of proliferation in all its aspects, to the enhancement of international peace and security’. It was thus anchored in the commitment to nuclear disarmament, to the achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world within a time bound frame. The Indian opposition to the final version of the CTBT came because it permitted the nuclear weapon states to continue their weapons related research and development activity using non-explosive technologies. It lacked any meaningful commitment to disarmament and instead only served to retain the existing status quo. The eventual debates on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would not be any different. It must be noted that India continues to call for universal nuclear disarmament even after the tests.

On 11 and 13 May 1998, twenty-four years after having detonated its first nuclear device at Pokharan in 1974, India conducted a series of nuclear tests. In his statement to the Parliament, Prime Minister Vajpayee spelt out the nuclear policy of his government in the post Pokharan II phase: One, India would maintain a minimum but credible nuclear deterrent. To achieve this, India did not require further testing and hence it was accepting a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear testing. Second, India would adhere to a ‘no first use’ doctrine as regards nuclear weapons. Finally, India continued with its commitment to global nuclear disarmament. This third aspect was again expounded at the non-aligned summit at Durban.

The Draft outline of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine released by the National Security Council on 17 August 1999 argues for autonomy in decision making about security for India. It takes the long established Indian line that security is an integral part of India’s developmental process. It expresses concerns about the possible disruption of peace and stability and the consequent need to create a deterrence capability to ensure the pursuit of development. It argues that in the absence of a global nuclear disarmament policy, India’s strategic interests require an effective credible deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. It continues to hold the ‘no first use doctrine’ and the civilian control of nuclear decision-making.

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## **14.6 DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT**

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Olaf Palme’s Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues argued that the military use of scarce resources and skills in developing countries increases human deprivation and has adverse impact on economic growth. The Inga Thorsson report on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development makes an explicit effort to link disarmament to



development. All governments feel the pressure of scarce resources. Increase in expenditure in one area necessitates a reduction in another. Development must be seen as a continuing need for economic growth. Coupling of disarmament with security is seen in terms of their mutual economic interdependence.

The traditional (realist school) approach to disarmament seeks to link disarmament to the attempt at reduction of the possibility of war. The central argument is that arms race would eventually lead to war and therefore, it is necessary to restrain countries from pursuing the path of armament buildup. Therein comes the logic of arms control or limitation, followed by conflict management and confidence building approaches to reduce the possibility of conflict. The Indian argument has followed a different line.

The Indian framework is based on the question 'how is peace maintained in a society of states?' The answer revolves around the fundamental principle that in any conflictual situation, the roots of conflict need to be tackled (conflict resolution, not conflict management). This is a long-term perspective and includes the consideration of the social, political, economic, and other aspects of conflict. It presumes that conflicts are a product of tensions emanating in social, political and economic areas that ultimately escalate into military conflict. It roots its approach in development policies, and thus assumes and demands a possibility of change in the existing order and as such takes a revisionist perspective. This can be seen in various fields: in the economic field it was articulated as a demand for a new economic order, in the political field it found expression in support to national liberation struggles, in the social field it was reflected in the demand for social justice and in the international context in the support for disarmament and linking disarmament to development.

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## 14.7 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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The 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S. brought the concept of postmodern terrorism into the forefront. It also raised several questions about the strategies designed to counter this new form of terrorism. The American strategy today appears to have the following key elements:

- i) The building up of an international front against terrorism: This front would have several layers, ranging from those that would be providing a principled support to those who would commit human and material resources to fight terrorism. This front would involve both, a political level action and an economic level action.
- ii) Legitimacy of the use of force: The difference between ethnic separatist movements based on the demand for right to self determination and the postmodern ideological pan religious movements has come to be acknowledged. The terrorist methodology used by the latter has become a matter of global concern. It also raised several questions about strategies designed to counter this new form of terrorism. There is an emergent consensus on the issue of legitimacy of use of force to tackle such forms of terrorism. The American action in Afghanistan and Iraq are indicators of this trend. Such a new found acceptance is to be seen against the backdrop of the growing concern about human rights violation that had come to be articulated since 1989-90. This legitimacy is no more within the state centric rationale of 'national security' or 'national interest', but based on an internationally accepted counter terrorist strategy that is now defined within the parameters of defence of democratic societies. The earlier criticism

against the slightest use of force would now be muted. This is not to grant any State agency the right to violate human rights. It is only to indicate a realisation on the part of the Human Rights groups that the terrorist outfits need not be sheltered.

- iii) The third element of the American strategic response emerged as the strike against Afghanistan came to be initiated. This element was an attempt to 'quarantine' the United States. The concern about the use of biological weapons by terrorists, especially the anthrax case, has led to the raising of barriers that the Americans have traditionally been unaccustomed to.

The debates about terrorism in India revolve around the following issues:

- a) **Ethnic-separatist terrorism:** Debate revolves around the concept of ethnic nationalism and the right to self-determination. The Kashmir problem is looked at from this perspective.
- b) **Post-modern pan-religious terrorism:** The approach goes beyond the limits of the geopolitical entity of a nation state system. The objectives are abstract and may be defined with reference to the religious resurgence of the post Cold War era. The 'targets' are likely to be symbols of a global (western) cosmopolitan world order.

The Indian strategic perceptions about the problems of terrorism today have a Pakistan-centric perception that has an inevitable linkage with events in Kashmir. The presentation of the problem has been structured as an undeclared, low intensity conflict or proxy war that is conducted by Pakistan and is fought through various militant groups. The attacks on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 have been looked at from this perspective.

A distinction needs to be made at two levels of militancy in Kashmir. One level is that of the demands made by the Kashmiri populace within the geopolitical framework of the nation state of India. These demands may be articulated by any of the groups in Kashmir, they would constitute legitimate demands that the State needs to address. The second level of militancy is a product of an abstract ideological struggle that has come to be labelled as 'Jihad'. This level of an agitation does not recognise any geopolitical boundaries and is a global war against the system. This is as much a threat to countries like India as it would be to Pakistan. It is at this second level threat that the counter terrorist strategy needs to be addressed.

The September 2001 events have provided a breakthrough in global perceptions that India needs to exploit. One, India needs to articulate its problems in Kashmir in the conceptual paradigm of terrorism. Two, follow-up these linkages with a public statement of its willingness to use force against those agencies that foster this terrorism. Traditionally, India has always articulated a non-military strategy for the resolution of border disputes. The use of diplomacy and consideration of force as a last option have been the twin bases of Indian strategy. India is well aware of the resultant political uncertainties of a cross border military action.

The September events have also altered the ground reality about the use of force to counter terrorism. The Human Rights groups have now gone on the back-foot on the matter of use of force against terrorist organisations. The earlier criticism against the slightest use of force would now be muted. This is not to grant any State agency the right to violate human rights. It is only to indicate a realisation on the part of the Human Rights groups that the Terrorist outfits need not be sheltered.

The traditional Indian counter terrorism strategy has been structured along several layers. It has sought the simultaneous use of the political and economic initiatives with the use of force. The key to counter terrorism had been the initiation of the political process in the disturbed area. But the success of this initiative can be achieved only if the threat of terrorism is contained. Such containment is necessarily a product of the use of force. It is to that end that the Indian policy makers would have to address themselves.

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## 14.8 SUMMARY

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The Indian Worldview about peace and security does not consider 9/11 as a landmark for change. Its views grew over the Cold War years and came to be crystallised in the post-Soviet era. The Indian worldview about peace and security can be understood at two levels. One is the framework of an anti-status quoists, revisionist Third World, facing problems of development and security; the other refers to the ground realities of a regional power like India seeking to assert itself in the comity of nations. The Indian approach to the problem of world order revolves around the assertion of an independent understanding of world affairs and peace approach. The Indian worldview is founded on its perception of development - economic, social and political. This framework is essentially revisionist in nature. In the economic field it has been articulated in the debates of the New International Economic Order and at the G-15 meetings; in the political sphere it took the form of anti-colonialism and in the social field it demanded international recognition to welfare rights and social justice. At a theoretical level, the Indian stand would be closer to the liberal institutionalists who accept the key assumptions of realism like the utility of military power, but at the same time insist upon the utility of institutions as the framework for cooperation.

The other area of threat is not of direct nature. This area would include the pressures from the G-8 and the developed world. This threat manifests itself in the issue area of development. The problem of development has two dimensions: the acquisition of new and advanced technology and capital investment. Today much of the advanced technology falls in the category of 'dual use' technology and as such is subject to several international restrictions. India faced a nonproliferation regime that sought to restrict the transfer of dual use technology to India. This regime evolved around the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (1968), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (proposed) in the nuclear area; and the Nuclear Suppliers Club (formed after the Pokharan Test of 1974), Missile Technology Control Regime (1987) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (1995) in the area of technology transfer. Similarly, foreign investments in the consumer sector far outpace those in the core infrastructural sector. India would be looking for more long-term direct foreign capital investments in the infrastructural sector rather than portfolio investments. At the domestic level, this would entail a restructuring of the Indian economy to make investments more attractive. At the international level it would require the diplomatic skills to face such laws like the Super 301 of the United States or the adverse impact of the GATT - WTO system and the emergent trade blocs around the world.

The nuclear tests by India in May 1998 have brought on the agenda a new set of strategic responses of India to the problems of security. The process that began with the first Nuclear Tests in 1974 and was carried through with such activities like the Integrated Missile Development Programme, ISRO's Satellite programme and the Antarctic expedition presented a new resilient and emergent India. The May 1998 tests represent a defiant independence in worldview in an age that is dominated by the nonproliferation regime. They came to represent a demonstration of

capabilities - technological and political. The technological capabilities were in the context of the denial of access to advanced technologies that India experienced over the years. The political capability represents the demonstration of political will of the elite to take on the G-7 (now G-8) regime.

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## 14.9 EXERCISES

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- 1) What is the meaning of arms control?
- 2) What is the meaning of disarmament?
- 3) What are the four pillars of disarmament strategy?
- 4) What are the functions of arms control?
- 5) What are the confidence building measures?
- 6) What is the machinery that deals with disarmament and related issues of arms control etc. within the United Nations framework?
- 7) What are the main initiatives taken to control the spread of nuclear weapons?
- 8) Identify the main initiatives taken by India to prevent a nuclear arms race.
- 9) What was the Indian opposition to NPT?
- 10) What are the main features of India's nuclear policy?
- 11) What are the main points made in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999?
- 12) What are the main features of American counter terrorism strategy?